Here are a few things that I've learned from the game which can be applied to matches past and ones yet to be played:
1) Confidence is the single biggest determining factor of a striker's success.
Quality of service and defensive shape be damned. If you hit the ball with the breezy confidence of one "Super Mario" Gomez it cannot help but go in. However, if your shot exhibits all the conviction of Mitt Romney's position on healthcare a la Robin van Persie's sorry excuse for a strike in the sixth minute, a positive outcome is unlikely to ensue. It's quite like the difference between Britney Spears' "Hit Me Baby One More Time" days and Spears' form post head shaving meltdown. The latter is just not pretty.
Cheer up there chap - it will only get better once you do.
Whether it's the contrast that Torres and di Natale so sharply brought into focus or the marked difference in the strike rate of van Persie and Gomez, a lack of self confidence is a self-inflicted, self-reinforcing wound for a striker.
Forwards are often faulted for their egos off the pitch, but their inflated sense of self seems to be a key differentiator between the class of Euro 2012 and its rejects on it
2) You must play to win the game, not just play to not lose it.
The Dutch have put on a master class on the latter throughout the tournament. Not only was Bertie's decision to start with two holding midfielders against Denmark, leaving the attacking prowess of Klaas-Jan Huntelaar and Raphael van der Vaart on the bench, indefensible in a game which you would likely need to win to progress, but it also had the perverse effect of providing the basis for the Dane's positive play. Michael Khron-Dehli et al were able to capitalize at the back because the Dutch were not able to kill off the game before they got their goal against the run of play, at which point Holland promptly proceeded to fall to pieces (confidence also being an important factor in overall team performance).
Still not good enough, Bomsie.
Put another way, starting Huntelaar and van der Vaart would've increased the odds of the Dutch playing up to their potential (the Hunter's 12 goals in 8 qualification games supporting this theory). But that wasn't what van Marwijk's chose. Why? Because his personnel choices were based on a desire not to lose the game, which is not to be confused with actually winning it. No matter that he chose a defensive midfield duo that couldn't defend, the reason they got the start was part and parcel of a plan for cautious play. The famed Dutch attacking prowess be damned, better to be pragmatic about the whole bit, eh? Well, we all know how that turned out.
More generally, you may find further proof of this phenomenon in the first forty-five minutes of both of Greece's outings and Sweden's "cowardly" opener against co-hosts Ukraine.
3) Don't underestimate the difficulty of making the simplest thing look easy.
The set-up for Gomez's brace was the result of simple, straightforward passing; his finishes, as clinical as the preceding delivery, appearing to be effortless in its execution. Or so we are meant to believe.
That's not so hard, now is it?
It is that very effortlessness that is the hallmark of a great team. Germany's passing was not the intricate stuff of Brazilian wet dreams, but it was purposeful, crisp and clean, and no easy feat (though, I wouldn't say it hurts the cause of cohesion when eight of your side play on the same club side).
Growing up, I was told that, if you are going to do something, do it well or not at all, but to do it well is in and of itself no easy task, especially at this level. What will separate the great from the good in Euro 2012 and beyond is the ability to make more moments like Mario - true quality lies in making the Herculean appear attainable.
